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Recent Developments
CIVIL RIGHTS-PUBLIC EMPLOYER MAY VOLUNTARILY ADOPT AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM TO REMEDY JUDICIALLY
DETERMINED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.
Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa. 1980)
In 1974, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania found in Commonwealth v. Glickman 1 that hiring pro-
cedures used by the Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire and the Pittsburgh Civil
Service Commission (Commission) had discriminated against blacks in
violation of federal law.2 As part of its remedial order, the district court
directed the Civil Service Commission to either show the validity of its
testing procedures or formulate a new job-related testing procedure.3
As a result of the federal court's decision, the Commission abandoned
its prior testing procedure and, beginning in June 1974, administered
new hiring examinations.4 Although minorities passed an examination
subsequently administered by the Commission in August 1975 in roughly
the same percentages as whites, minorities did not place in substantial
numbers at the top of the list.3 Thus in March 1976, when the city
requested the Commission to certify twenty candidates for new openings
as firefighters, 6 only three of those among the first twenty were minor-
ities.7 Mindful of its obligation to remedy proven racial discrimination,
and in light of the failure of its revised testing program to remedy that
discrimination, the Commission voted unanimously to depart from the
"top down" hiring requirements of the Pennsylvania Firemen's Civil
1. 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
2. Id. at 730-31.
3. Id. at 737-38.
4. Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470, 476, 412 A.2d 860, 864 (1980).
5. Id. at 477, 412 A.2d at 864.
6. Id. The Second Class Cities Firemen's Civil Service Act requires hiring
be accomplished from the top down on a competitive list. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 23491-98 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979). Section 23493.1(a) of the Act
provides that:
Both original appointments and promotions to any position in the
competitive class in any bureau of fire in any city of the second class
shall be made only from the top of the competitive list: Provided,
however, That the appointing officer may pass over the person on the
top of the competitive list for just cause in writing. Any person so
passed over shall, upon written request, be granted a public hearing
before the Civil Service Commission.
Id. § 23493. 1(a).
7. 488 Pa. at 477, 412 A.2d at 864.
(167)
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Service Act and to certify ten white applicants and ten minority
applicants.8
Claiming that they would have been hired but for the Commission's
decision to certify equal numbers of whites and minorities, white ap-
plicants9 for jobs as firefighters challenged the use of race-conscious
hiring procedures in a hearing before the Commission, but were denied
relief.' The Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County denied a statu-
tory appeal 11 and dismissed a request for injunctive relief.12 The
Commonwealth Court reversed,' 3 ruling that the Commission's voluntary
action offended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),' 4
the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, 15 the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act,' 6 and state statutes regulating the civil
services. 17 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
order of the Commonwealth Court, and reinstated the order of the trial
court,' 8 holding that a public employer may voluntarily adopt an
affirmative action program to remedy judicially determined racial dis-
crimination.' 9 Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470, 412 A.2d
860 (1980).
8. Id. at 477-78, 412 A.2d at 865.
9. Id. at 478, 412 A.2d at 865. The plaintiffs were ranked between 15
and 20 on a single test list derived from a 1975 examination. Id. at 478, 412
A.2d at 864.
10. Id. at 478, 412 A.2d at 865. The basis of the plaintiffs' appeal to the
Commission was the Second Class Cities Firemen's Civil Service Act which
provides in pertinent part that "appointments . . . shall be made only from
the top of the competitive list . . . . Any person . . . passed over shall . . .
be granted a public hearing before the Civil Service Commission." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 23493.1 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979). For the complete text of
§ 23493.1, see note 6 supra.
11. 488 Pa. at 478-79, 412 A.2d at 865. The basis of the plaintiffs' appeal
to the Common Pleas Court was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23497.3 (Purdon 1957
& Supp. 1979), which provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person aggrieved
by the findings of the commission shall have the right to appeal to the court
of common pleas of the county." Id.
12. 488 Pa. at 478-79, 412 A.2d at 865.
13. Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 98, 375 A.2d 841
(1977), rev'd, 488 Pa. 470, 412 A.2d 860 (1980). Two judges on the Common-
wealth Court dissented. 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 113-14, 375 A.2d at 848-49
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 105-07, 375 A.2d at 845-46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
15. 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 107-08, 375 A.2d at 846. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
16. 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 103-05, 375 A.2d at 844-45. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon 1964 8 Supp. 1979).
17. 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 102, 375 A.2d at 844. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 23491-98 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979).
18. 488 Pa. at 474, 412 A.2d at 862.
19. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the Commission's
institution of temporary remedial race-conscious hiring was not prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) the Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Act does not bar race-conscious voluntary remedial action; (3) the Second
Class Cities Fireman's Civil Service Act did not prohibit voluntary remedial
[VOL. 26: p. 167
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,20 five justices
of the United States Supreme Court 2 ' addressed equal protection ques-
tionS 22 raised by a governmental entity's adoption of a race-conscious
affirmative action plan.23 These five justices agreed that the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not, in all circum-
stances, prohibit a governmental entity from utilizing racial classifica-
tions.2 4 Following the Bakke decision that affirmative action plans do
action in certifying ten white and ten minority applicants for jobs as fire-
fighters; and (4) the Commission's institution of temporary race-conscious hiring
in response to an existing federal judicial mandate to correct found racial dis-
crimination was not prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 470-71, 412 A.2d at 861.
20. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21. Justice Powell announced the decision of the Court. Id. at 265. Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun [hereinafter referred to as the
Brennan group] concurred with Justice Powell in upholding the permissibility
of considering race in university admissions decisions. Id. at 325.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which reads in pertinent part: "[nior
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of the law; nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
23. 438 U.S. at 355-56. Bakke represented the first time the Supreme Court
decided a "reverse discrimination" case on the merits. Note, Equal Protection,
92 HARV. L. REV. 131, 131 n.2 (1978). The Court had previously been pre-
sented with this issue, but dismissed the case as moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974). The Bakke case involved a challenge to a special
admissions program established by the University of California at Davis Medical
School. 438 U.S. at 272-75. The program reserved 16 out of 100 places in the
entering medical school class for qualified disadvantaged minority students. Id.
A non-minority applicant who had been rejected by the medical school attacked
the race-conscious special admissions program as violative of both the general
anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI of the federal civil rights act and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 276-77. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976).
Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger
[hereinafter referred to as the Stevens group], found it unnecessary to reach the
constitutional issue because they concluded that, without regard to constitu-
tional demands, Title VI should be interpreted to bar the medical school from
adopting the race-conscious affirmative action program at issue in that case.
438 U.S. at 416-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A
majority, however, rejected the notion that, in the context of affirmative action
plans, Title VI should be interpreted as more restrictive than the equal pro-
tection clause. See id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 287. Thus, five Justices concluded that, "Title VI prohibits
only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ...... Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See id. at 287. In light of this conclusion, these Justices found it nec-
essary to address and resolve the equal protection issue. Id. at 355-79 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 287-320.
24. 438 U.S. at 355-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 305-06. The coalition split, however, on the question of the nature
of the state interest necessary to support the adoption of a race-conscious
remedial measure. Id. at 307-10; id. at 362-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Reviewing the medical school's justifications for the
program, the Brennan group concluded that the objective of remedying the
effects of "general societal discrimination" was sufficiently important to justify
the adoption of the school's numerical racial ratio program. Id. at 369 (Bren-
3
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not, per se, deny equal protection, the Supreme Court in United Steel-
workers v. Weber,25 was presented with a Title VII challenge to an
affirmative action craft training program 26 established pursuant to an
employer-union collective bargaining agreement. 27 Title VII was en-
acted to eliminate employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
or national origin.28 Courts are authorized under Title VII to enjoin
employers 29 from engaging in discriminatory practices and to order ap-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell, however,
while rejecting the amelioration of societal discrimination as a justification,
concluded that the medical school's interest in obtaining a diverse student body
was sufficient to justify a race-conscious admissions program. Id. at 310-12.
He therefore joined the Brennan group in overturning the portion of the trial
court judgment which totally barred the medical school from considering race
in the admissions process. Id. at 320. At the same time, because Justice Powell
found that the medical school had not demonstrated that its numerical racial
ratio program actually furthered the school's interest in obtaining a diverse
student body, he joined with the Stevens group in invalidating the specific
special admissions program at issue in that case. Id. at 315-20.
25. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For thorough analysis of Weber, see Powers
Implications of Weber-"A Net Beneath", 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 315 (1980);
Note, Civil Rights-Employment Discrimination-Employer May Establish Vol-
untary Aflirmative Action Program Within Area of Discretion Granted by Title
VII, 25 VILL. L. REV. 141 (1979).
26. 443 U.S. at 197. In order to alleviate racial imbalances in its craft
work force, Kaiser Aluminum instituted a plan to reserve for black employees
50% of the openings in its in-plant craft training programs until the percentage
of black craftworkers approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force. Id. at 198.
27. Id. at 198. The suit was filed by white employees with more seniority
who were excluded from the program because of the 50% requirement. Id. at
199.
28. HousE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963), reprinted in I EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT oF 1964 at 2018 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1964]. The legislative history of Title VII indicates that its pur-
pose was "to eliminate, through utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion or
national origin." 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1964, supra, at 2026. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). While originally applying only to private
employers, Title VII was amended in 1972 to extend coverage to public em-
ployees as well. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court, in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), specifically recognized that the legislative his-
tory of the 1972 amendment extending Title VII to public employees evidenced
an intent that "the same principles be applied to government and private
employers alike." 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. Every federal court of appeals that
has considered the issue has concluded that the same prerequisites of Title VII
liability apply to both private and public employer. See, e.g., Scott v. City
of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917
(1980); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Fire-
[VOL. 26: p. 167
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propriate equitable relief, including affirmative action, 0 and the courts
of appeals have consistently upheld race-conscious hiring as a remedy
for violation of Title VII.3 1 It has been held to be reversible error for
a district court to withhold quota relief when other forms of relief
failed to eliminate racially discriminatory practices or effects.8 2 Addi-
tionally, federal courts, including the Third Circuit, have upheld the
validity of race-conscious hiring programs incorporated in consent decrees
between parties. 83
The Weber court acknowledged that, although a literal construction
of the anti-discrimination section of Title VII might preclude all race-
conscious remedial programs,3 4 it would be inappropriate to adopt such
a construction.3 5 Accordingly, the Court held that Title VII's pro-
hibition against racial discrimination does not compel a "color blind"
approach to all employment remedies.3 6 While the Weber court did
not "define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and
impermissible affirmative action 'plans," 37 the possibility that some af-
firmative action plans may be invalid under Title VII was acknowl-
edged.3 8 In holding the affirmative action plan at issue in Weber to be
permissible,3 9 the Court looked to three elements: 1) the plan's pur-
fighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 819 (1977).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The statute provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging
in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization,
as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice),
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Id.
31. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 436-37 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Isakson v. United States, 436 U.S. 932 (1978);
United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 943 (1970).
32. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 891 (1974).
33. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
34. 443 U.S. at 202.
35. 443 U.S. at 202. After examining the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act and reviewing the historical context in which the act arose, the
Court concluded that "an interpretation of the sections [which forbids] all
race-conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an end completely at vari-
ance with the purpose of the statute' and must be rejected." Id., quoting
United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953).
36. 443 U.S. at 208.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 208-09.
39. Id. at 208.
1980-1981]
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pose; 40 2) its effect on the interests of non-minority employees; 41 and
3) its duration.42
In the wake of Bakke and Weber, one federal court of appeals 4
and two state supreme courts 44 have validated voluntary governmental
affirmative action programs which utilized race-conscious hiring goals or
ratios. 4 5 In Detroit Police Officers Association v. Young,46 an affirmative
action plan voluntarily adopted by the Detroit Police Department re-
quired that fifty percent of all promotions go to minorities. 47 The Sixth
Circuit held that the promotion program established by the police de-
partment was reasonable and did not violate Title VII, 48 but remanded
the case for further consideration of the constitutional issue. 4 9  In
40. Id. The Weber Court observed that "[t]he purposes of the plan mirror
those of the statute. Both were designed to break down old patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to 'open employment oppor-
tunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them.'" Id., quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
41. Id. The majority noted that:
The plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white em-
ployees. The plan does not require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees . . . . Nor does the plan
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of
those trained in the program will be white.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 208-09. The Court stated:
[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance,
Preferential selection of craft trainees will end as soon as the per-
centage of black skilled craftworkers . . . approximates the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force.
Id.
43. Detroit Police Officers' Assoc. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 697-98 (6th Cir.
1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080).
44. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, - Cal. 3d -, -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 493,
604 P.2d 1365, 1383 (1980); Maehren v. City of Seattle, - Wash. 2d -, -, 599
P.2d 1255, 1270 (1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3453 (Jan. 5, 1980)
(No. 79-1061).
45. While Weber involved private employment and concerned the scope
of a private employer's discretion under Title VII, these cases involve Title
VII challenges to public employment affirmative action programs. For a dis-
cussion of the application of Title VII to public employment, see note 29
supra.
46. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466
(Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080).
47. 608 F.2d at 681. In Young, the plaintiffs were an association of police
officers and a number of white Detroit policemen who were passed over for
promotion to the rank of sergeant when black officers with lower numerical
standings on the eligibility list received promotions. Id. at 671. They sued
to enjoin the city police department from continuing operation of the volun-
itarily initiated affirmative action plan that had been adopted. Id.
48. Id. at 696.
49. Id. at 671.
[VOL. 26: p. 167
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Maehren v. City of Seattleo the City of Seattle had voluntarily adopted
an affirmative action program whereby, in order to achieve ratios of
minority, female or handicapped workers in all city classifications equal
to their ratios in the community, job candidates could be selected in
other than the normal order.51 The Washington Supreme Court held,
inter alia, that Title VII permitted use of voluntary affirmative action
programs,5 2 and that selective certification procedures did not violate
the equal protection clause of the United States or Washington constitu-
tions.5 3 In Price v. Civil Service Commission,54 the Sacramento County,
California district attorney challenged an order by the county civil
service commission requiring that, in order to correct the underrepre-
sentation of minorities in the district attorney's office, which the Com-
mission found to have resulted from unintentional discriminatory hiring
practices, at least one minority be hired for every two non-minority
persons.5 5 The Supreme Court of California held that neither the
pertinent federal or state anti-discrimination statutes nor the Constitu-
tional equal protection guarantee could be interpreted to prohibit a
government employer from voluntarily implementing a reasonable race-
conscious hiring program to remedy the effects of the employer's own
past discriminatory employment practices. 56
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (Act) 57 was enacted in
1955 for the purpose of remedying discrimination against those histori-
cally subordinated.58 The Act makes it an "unlawful discriminatory
practice" for "any employer because of race . . . to refuse to hire or
50. - Wash. 2d -, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W.
3453 (Jan. 5, 1980) (No. 79-1061). In Maehren, employees of the city fire
department brought an action challenging the affirmative action program used
by the fire department and city in hiring and promotion of personnel. -
Wash. 2d at -, 599 P.2d at 1255.
51. - Wash. 2d at -, 599 P.2d at 1260. The affirmative action plan in
Maehren was adopted without the predicate of judicially determined discrimi-
nation. Id. However, the trial court in Maehren subsequently found that
"the City's past employees selection processes had discriminated against minority
applicants, the effects of which were continuing and that such discrimination
affected hiring and promotion of uniform personnel within the Seattle Fire
Department." Id. at -, 599 P.2d at 1262-63.
52. Id. at -, 599 P.2d at 1261.
53. Id. at - 599 P.2d at 1262-64.
54. - Cal. 3d -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 604 P.2d 1365 (1980).
55. Id. at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 478-80, 604 P.2d at 1370. The Superior
Court of Sacramento County entered judgment in favor of the district attorney
and the civil service commission appealed. Id. at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 475,
604 P.2d at 1365. The Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded.
Id.
56. Id. at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 475, 604 P.2d at 1365.
57. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of Oct. 27, 1955, Pub. L. No.
744, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1979).
58. See 1955 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUsE at 429-48; 1955 LEGISLATIVE
JOURNAL-SENATE at 2653-66, 2821-28.
1980-1981]
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employ" an individual; 59 or to "[d]eny or limit, through a quota system,
employment . . . because of race . . ," 0 In addition, the Act estab-
lished the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and gave it au-
thority to order a variety of affirmative relief, including anything which,
in the Commission's judgment, "[would] effectuate the purposes of this
act . ... " 61 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted the
Act to permit Human Relations Commission orders requiring remedial
racial quotas in response to racially discriminatory practices, 62 and to
prohibit actions which have an unjustifiable racially disproportionate
impact.0 3
The Second Class Cities Firemen's Civil Service Act (Civil Service
Act) 04 was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature to prohibit political
patronage hiring and promotion in public employment, 5 particularly
in the Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire, 0 by requiring that appointments and
promotions be made on the basis of merit "from the top of the com-
petitive list." 67
Against this background, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its
analysis in Chmill by considering the question of whether the Commis-
sion's certification plan violated Title VII. 8 While noting that the
Supreme Court in Weber did not "detail the 'line of demarcation be-
tween permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans,' "09 the
majority looked for guidance to the Weber court's consideration of the
plan's purpose, 70 its effect on the interests of non-minority employees,7 1
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon 1964 8: Supp. 1979).
60. Id. § 955(b)(3).
61. Id. § 959.
62. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Housing Auth., 458
Pa. 67, 327 A.2d 335 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975); Balsbaugh v.
Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972).
63. General Electric Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 469
Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 (1976); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Chester Housing Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 327 A.2d 335 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
974 (1975).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23493.1 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979). See note
6 supra.
65. See 1963 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE at 679.
66. See id. (remarks of Sen. Fleming).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23493.1(a) (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979). See
note 6 supra.
68. 488 Pa. at 479-90, 412 A.2d at 865-71. The court noted that the appel-
lees did not challenge the validity of the Glickman court's findings of dis-
crimination. Id. at 481, 412 A.2d at 866. See 370 F. Supp. at 729-34.
69. 488 Pa. at 484, 412 A.2d at 868, quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. at 208.
70. 488 Pa. at 484, 412 A.2d at 868. See note 40 and accompanying text
supra.
71. 488 Pa. at 484, 412 A.2d at 868. See note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
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and its duration.7 2 Observing that the Chmill plan was developed in
good faith,73 was not overly broad,74 and was a temporary means of
correcting substantial racial disparity, 75 the majority concluded that the
Commission's plan satisfied the Weber standards.
76
Furthermore, the court refused to distinguish between the require-
ments of Title VII as applied to a private employment in Weber and
public employment in the case before it. 77 The court asserted that this
reading of Title VII is consistent with the evident intent of Congress,
which expanded Title VII coverage to public employment for the "very
purpose of providing state employees with the same protection afforded
those already under the Act." 78 The court next rejected the view that
Title VII prohibits the Commission from adopting an affirmative action
72. 488 Pa. at 484, 412 A.2d at 868. See note 42 and accompanying text
supra.
73. 488 Pa. at 485, 412 A.2d at 868. The majority pointed out that there
is no dispute that the Commission's action was taken in good faith to correct
a history of substantial intentional discrimination in the Bureau of Fire. Id.
The majority noted that the Commission's plan was intended to fulfill "the
central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination . . . and making per-
sons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id., quoting
Franks v. Bowmans Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976).
74. 488 Pa. at 485-86, 412 A.2d at 868-69. The majority pointed out that,
like the plan in Weber, the Commission's action does not "eliminate all whites
from job competition and does not deny to any person a job previously prom-
ised." Id. at 486, 412 A.2d at 869, quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. at 208.
75. 488 Pa. at 486, 412 A.2d at 869.
76. Id. at 485-86, 412 A.2d at 868-69.
77. Id. at 486-87, 412 A.2d at 869. The majority noted that two state
supreme courts and a federal court of appeals presented with situations similar
to Chmill had approved voluntary affirmative action plans by public employers.
Id. at 486-87, 412 A.2d at 869, citing Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Jan.
10, 1980) (No. 79-1980); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., - Cal. 3d -, 604 P.2d
1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980); Maehren v. City of Seattle, - Wash. 2d -,
599 P.2d 1255 (1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3453 (Jan. 5, 1980)
(No. 79-1061). For a discussion of the cases cited by the Chmill court, see
notes 43-56 and accompanying text supra.
78. 488 Pa. at 487, 412 A.2d at 869. The majority stated, however, that
"we need not decide this important federal issue here since we believe that the
Commission's action is permissible even assuming a more stringent standard of
justification than adopted in Weber." Id. The court noted that, in this case,
they were not limited to taking judicial notice of historic discrimination in the
municipal fire department, but rather could rely on the previous federal judicial
finding that the department had discriminated against minorities in its hiring
programs. Id. at 487-88, 412 A.2d at 869-70. The majority noted that, in
addition, they had the common pleas court's findings that the Commission's
action at issue was taken as a necessary practical response to the federal judicial
mandate to correct the racial discrimination. Id. at 488, 412 A.2d at 870. The
majority concluded that "viewed in this light, . . . the justification for the
Commission's action [was] compelling." Id.
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plan voluntarily79 and concluded by holding that the Commission was
not precluded by Title VII from adopting its proposed plan.s
°
The court next addressed the issue of whether the Commission's
plan violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 8' The majority
noted that nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggested an in-
tention to limit in any way the scope of possible remedial affirmative
action 82 and also observed that an "absolute proscription on voluntary
remedial affirmative action . . . is completely contrary to the statute's
basic preference for voluntary compliance." 88 Thus, the court con-
cluded that public employers who sought to remedy racial discrimination
by affirmative action programs would not be prohibited from doing so
by state law.s4
79. Id. at 488, 412 A.2d at 870. The majority stated that "such a prohi-
bition on voluntary compliance with the Act [is] irreconciliable with the funda-
mentally conciliatory nature of the federal statute." Id. The court observed
that "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means for achieving [the goals of Title VIII." Id., quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). The majority also observed that
voluntary compliance is particularly appropriate in the area of public employ-
ment. 488 Pa. at 489, 412 A.2d at 870. The court asserted that "[i]n expand-
ing Title VII's coverage to include public employment, Congress expressed
natural concern over federal involvement in state and local employment mat-
ters." Id. The court stated: "[WMe do not readily believe that federal law
requires states and state agencies to refrain from good faith compliance with
federal employment standards only so that a federal court may order them to
act." Id. at 490, 412 A.2d at 871. The court concluded that "we have no
doubt that voluntary state compliance, where forthcoming, is inevitably superior
to the often difficult practical problems of federal supervisory jurisdiction." Id.
80. 488 Pa. at 490, 412 A.2d at 871.
81. Id. at 491, 412 A.2d at 871. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text
supra. The court stated that the Act should be construed in light of "prin-
ciples of fair employment law which have emerged relative to the federal
[statute] ....... 488 Pa. at 491, 412 A.2d at 871, quoting General Electric
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 469 Pa. 292, 303, 365 A.2d
649, 654 (1976). The majority stated that, while the independent status of the
Pennsylvania statute should not be ignored or diminished, the facts of Chmill
presented a particularly appropriate situation in which to harmonize the two
statutes. 488 Pa. at 491, 412 A.2d at 871.
82. 488 Pa. at 492, 412 A.2d at 872. The majority observed that the legis-
lative history of the Act makes evident that the pervading purpose of the
legislation was to remedy discrimination against those historically subordinated.
Id. The court stated that the statute's remedial nature is apparent in several
of its provisions, including the legislature's express admonition that: "The pro-
visions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the
purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent with any provisions hereof shall not
apply." 488 Pa. at 493, 412 A.2d at 872, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(a)
(Purdon 1964).
83. 488 Pa. at 493, 412 A.2d at 873. The majority observed that the
legislature charged the Human Relations Commission with the duty to attempt
to obtain voluntary compliance by "conference, conciliation and persuasion"
in cases where it believes discriminatory practices exist. Id. at 493, 412 A.2d
at 872-73, quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon 1964).
84. 488 Pa. at 494-95, 412 A.2d at 873.
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The question of whether the Commission's action violated the
Second Class Cities Firemen's Civil Service Act 85 requirements for the
appointment of firefighters was subsequently confronted by the court.86
The majority rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Commission's
decision to certify from two lists was inconsistent with the express
language of the statute.87 The court stated that the Commission's action
did not conflict with the statutory requirement of merit selection,88
noting that "uncontradicted substantial evidence" 89 supported the trial
court's finding that all of the candidates who passed the Commission's
1975 test were equally qualified for jobs as firefighters. 90 The court ac-
cordingly held that the civil service statute did not bar the Commis-
sion's action.91
Finally the court turned to the question of whether the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits a public employer,
found guilty of prior racial discrimination, from voluntarily adopting
racial hiring preferences as appropriate remedial action.9 2 The majority
stated that "although Bakke . . .provides us with no single opinion of
the Court concerning the constitutional limitations on affirmative action,
we believe that the Commission's plan in this case satisfies the constitu-
tional standards of all five Justices who considered the question." 03
85. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
86. 488 Pa. at 495-98, 412 A.2d at 873-75.
87. Id. at 496, 412 A.2d at 874.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court observed that the Commission's Chief Examiner, testify-
ing before the court of common pleas, stated that a score of higher than the
passing score of 75 was not evidence of greater qualification. Id. The court
noted that this testimony was reflected in the trial court's unchallenged finding
that "the minority applicants who would be given preference are as qualified
for the position of firefighter as those who scored higher on the examination."
Id. at 497, 412 A.2d at 875. Because of this finding, the majority considered
it unnecessary to decide whether the Commission might have had discretion to
certify minority applicants less qualified than the appellees. Id. at 497-98, 412
A.2d at 875. The court noted, however, that the section on which the appel-
lees relied expressly permitted the Commission to refuse to hire from the "top
of the . . .list" for "just cause in writing." Id., quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,§ 23493.1(a) (Purdon 1957). The court opined "that in some circumstances
remedial compliance with some other state and federal employment standards
would be sufficient to meet this just cause requirement." 488 Pa. at 498, 412
A.2d at 875.
91. 488 Pa. at 498, 412 A.2d at 875.
92. Id. at 498-504, 412 A.2d at 875-78. See note 22 supra. The court
noted that their "touchstone" was the Bakke decision. 488 Pa. at 499, 412
A.2d at 875.
93. 488 Pa. at 500, 412 A.2d at 876. The majority noted that they were
satisfied that their view was consistent with what Justice Brennan described as
"the central meaning" of the opinions in Bakke when they are read together,
and quoted from Justice Brennan's opinion: "Government may take race into
account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy
disadvantages case [sic] on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when
appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative
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The majority noted that the plan would be acceptable to Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and White because it served important
governmental objectives, 94 was "substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives," 95 and did not stigmatize any group or "single out
those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of
a benign program," 96 The court next concluded that, because there
was a predicate of judicially determined discrimination, the plan satisfied
the standards articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke.97
bodies with competence to act in this area." Id., quoting Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
94. 488 Pa. at 500-01, 412 A.2d at 876. The majority observed that the
Brennan group left no doubt that providing a remedy for past racial discrimi-
nation was an important governmental objective. Id. at 501, 412 A.2d at 876.
The court noted that these justices had found the University of California's
purpose of remedying the effects on medical school admissions of past societal
discrimination to be a suitable goal, and observed that they expressly declared
that remedial measures taken in response to a judicial finding of prior dis-
crimination would be a fortiori acceptable. Id. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 488 U.S. at 366 & n.42.
95. 488 Pa. at 500-01, 412 A.2d at 876. The majority noted that the
Commission's plan was appropriately related to its remedial goal. Id. The
court observed that there was substantial evidence in the record to indicate
that the Commission's action in the case was a necessary practical step toward
achieving adequate minority representation in the Bureau of Fire. Id. The
majority also noted that the trial court found that "no other alternative than
a preferential hiring quota [would] relieve the situation." Id. The court went
on to note that "the City's request to certify candidates for twenty new posi-
tions in the Bureau presented the Commission with an unusual opportunity to
remedy a racial imbalance which had persisted despite substantial efforts at
minority recruitment." Id. at 501, 412 A.2d at 876-77. The majority also
pointed out that the Commission's proposal did not interfere with any existing
employment rights. Id. at 501, 412 A.2d at 877.
96. Id. at 501, 412 A.2d at 877. The Chmill court noted that, as with the
Davis Medical School admissions program in Bakke, neither blacks nor whites
were stigmatized or singled out to bear the burden of the Commission's plan.
Id. The court observed that the minority applicants affected by the program
voluntarily intervened as defendants in the trial court urging support of the
Commission's action. Id. The court also noted that the white applicants were
not forced to bear an inappropriate burden and observed that nothing in the
record suggested that the appellees were any more qualified than the minority
applicants the Commission wished to certify. Id. The court further observed
that 50% of those to be certified were white, and that under the applicable
state civil service law the appellees would have remained on the eligibility list.
Id. The majority pointed out that, under usual practices, appellees would
have been certified at a later date and concluded that any potential harm to
the appellees "simply does not outweigh the necessity for the effective remedial
action taken by the Commission." Id.
97. Id. The majority noted that, in Justice Powell's view, racial classifica-
tions are always suspect and should accordingly be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Id. The court observed that as Justice Powell described this approach, a state's
use of even a remedial classification would be permissible only if "its purpose
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and . . . its use
of the classification is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or
to the safeguarding of its interest." Id., quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305. The court noted, however, that like Justice Brennan
and those who joined him, Justice Powell acknowledged that the objective of
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Lastly, the court approached the question of whether the specific
remedial action adopted by the Commission was constitutionally valid.98
The majority noted that Justice Powell's opinion "strongly suggested"
that explicit racial preferences would be acceptable if they were in re-
sponse to "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitu-
tional or statutory violations." 09 The Chmill majority stated that they
considered the district court's previous findings of discrimination in
Commonwealth v. Glickman to be sufficient to meet the threshold re-
quirement articulated by Justice Powell 100 and thus concluded that the
Commission's remedial plan was not prohibited by the equal protection
clause.' 0 '
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen observed that the Firemen's
Civil Service Act expressly required appointment to the fire department
to be made from the top of a competitive list.102 Justice Larsen further
noted that the purpose of the Act was to eliminate discrimination by
establishing certification from the top down as a mechanical procedure.' 03
In Justice Larsen's view, the majority's approval of the program at issue
"would destroy this noble goal by . . .giving to the employing agency
remedying past discrimination was substantial. 488 Pa. at 502, 412 A.2d at 877.
The court further observed that Justice Powell "strongly stated" that, given
the predicate of judicially determined discrimination, remedial race-conscious
action should be permissible. Id.
98. 488 Pa. at 503, 412 A.2d at 877.
99. Id., quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
The majority also noted that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke had been
similarly interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Price v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, - Cal. 3d -, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 604 P.2d 1365 (1980), and by a
number of legal scholars. 488 Pa. at 503, 412 A.2d at 877. The majority noted
that, in disapproving the University of California's self-initiated admissions
program, Justice Powell specifically distinguished the Court's employment dis-
crimination cases and the decisions of the federal courts of appeals which had
required racial preferences as remedies for established violations of federal
employment laws. Id. at 503, 412 A.2d at 878. The court next observed that
Justice Powell did not suggest that courts are the only governmental bodies
which may take action to remedy discrimination once an appropriate determi-
nation of prior discrimination has been made. Id.
100. 488 Pa. at 504, 412 A.2d at 878.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 508, 412 A.2d at 880 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen
considered the "overriding question" to be whether the court should permit
"a Commission established by the legislature to 'enact' rules contrary to those
established by the legislature." Id. at 506, 412 A.2d at 879 (Larsen, J., dis-
senting). Justice Larsen asserted that, if the Commission felt the quota system
was needed in order to remedy past discrimination, it should have sought a
judicial determination, based upon a record developed in open court, of
whether the quota system was necessary to correct past discriminatory behavior.
Id. Justice Larsen also noted that, in the alternative, the Commission could
have sought amendments to the law to permit two certified lists of candidates.
Id.
103. Id. at 506, 412 A.2d at 879 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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the right to pick and choose who would be certified." 104 Justice Larsen
considered Weber irrelevant because the governmental agency involved
in Chmill was without authority to establish a quota system uni-
laterally.105
On reviewing the court's opinion in Chmill, it is submitted that the
court correctly decided that the Weber decision could be extended to
cover public employees. 06 The United States Supreme Court has spe-
cifically recognized that the legislative history of the 1972 amendment
extending Title VII to public employees evidenced an intent that "the
same Title VII principles be applied to government and private em-
ployers alike." 107 Furthermore, every court of appeals that has passed
on the issue has concluded that the requirements of Title VII apply with
equal force to both private and public employers.108
It is further submitted that, by applying the Weber standards to
the plan in Chmill, the court properly tested the plan.109 The court's
analysis of the plan's purpose, its effect on non-minorities, and its dura-
tion was appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Weber
and is consistent with other courts' reading of that case.110 Moreover,
the court's harmonizing of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act with
Title VII is likewise appropriate in light of the legislative history of the
Act 111 and consistent with other state court interpretations of similar
state anti-discrimination statutes."12
Additionally, the analysis used by the court to conclude that the
plan in Chmill satisfies the equal protection criteria established by
Justice Powell in Bakke appears to be sound." 3 The predicate of judi-
104. Id. at 508, 412 A.2d at 880 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen
noted that the trial court had found that the Civil Service Commission "vio-
lated the express terms of the Civil Service Act ...." Id.
105. Id.
106. See notes 107-08 and accompanying text infra.
107. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). See note 29
supra.
108. See note 29 supra and authorities cited therein.
109. See 488 Pa. at 479-90, 412 A.2d at 865-71.
110. Cf. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, - Cal. 3d at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at
483-88, 604 P.2d at 1376 (Weber construed to require an examination of an
affirmative action plan's purpose, its effect on non-minorities, and its duration,
to determine whether the plan violates Title VII). See notes 68-76 and accom-
panying text supra.
111. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
112. Cf. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, - Cal. 3d at -, 161 Cal. Rptr. at
487, 604 P.2d at 1376 (the anti-discrimination provisions of the California Fair
Employment Practice Act construed by the California Supreme Court as con-
sistent with Title VI1).
113. See notes 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
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,cially determined discrimination is clearly sufficient to permit a race-
conscious affirmative action plan in Justice Powell's view,"14 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that such a judicial deter-
mination would be sufficient to permit explicit racial preferences appears
.to be the correct interpretation of Justice Powell's opinion.1 5
Finally, it is submitted that the court has failed to address ade-
.-quately the contention that the Firemen's Civil Service Act prohibits
the affirmative action plan at issue.'1 6 While it may be true, as the
-court notes, that a higher score on the examination does not signify
,greater potential job competency, 1 7 the Civil Service Act envisions hir-
ing applicants with higher test scores first." 8 Any deviation from this
practice must be "for just cause in writing." 119 The majority implies
that the Commission's efforts to remedy past discrimination would fall
within this "just cause" exception. 120 It is submitted, however, that
their failure to hold so explicitly undermines the procedures required
by the Civil Service Act to ensure fairness in hiring.12 ' In view of the
fact that the Civil Service Act represents a considered attempt by the
Legislature to remedy another specific societal ill, it is suggested that
the Act's provisions are entitled, at the very least, to the application of
a more considered analysis which seeks to balance the goals of the Act
with those of the affirmative action program. The court's more sum-
mary analysis, however, fails to provide the Legislature, the lower courts,
and prospective litigants with workable guidelines on how best to ac-
commodate the twin goals of merit hiring and affirmative action. Con-
sequently, it is submitted that the long range impact of Chmill may
well be to engender further litigation whenever these two goals come
into conflict.
On the facts of this case, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has joined the ranks of those courts which have sought to fashion a
coherent, sensitive, and realistic social policy out of the often bewilder-
ing problem of affirmative action and reverse discrimination. 122 These
courts have striven in their decisions to encourage progressive social
policy while minimizing social friction. It would be difficult to envision
114. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion
,of Powell, J.).
115. Id.
116. See notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra.
117. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 6, 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 6 supra.
120. 488 Pa. at 498, 412 A.2d at 879.
121. See notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 43-56 and accompanying text supra.
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the United States Supreme Court adopting a position far afield from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in this case.1 23
Paul K. Risko
123, Two cases on point with Chmill are subjects of petitions for certiorari
to the Supreme Court: Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671
(6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Jan. 10, 1980) (No.
79-1080); Maehren v. City of Seattle, - Wash. 2d -, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3453 (Jan. 5, 1980) (No. 79-1061).
Additionally, the Court has recently heard oral argument on a prison
guard's challenge to an affirmative action plan implemented by the California
Department of Corrections. Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 95
Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979). The plan in Minnick, adopted
by the Department of Corrections without a predicate of judicially determined
discrimination, sought to increase the number of female employees in the
department to a level equalling their percentage in the California labor force
and to increase the number of minority employees generally to a number
equalling at least 70% of any given minority in the prison population. Id. at
513-14, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 264. A California state trial court declared the plan
unconstitutional, but the California Court of Appeals held the plan permissible
by Bakke standards. Id. at 517-26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 266-72. The California
Supreme Court refused to review the ruling. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3417 (Dec. 2,
1980). The reports of the oral argument before the United States Supreme
Court, however, appear to indicate that the Court may be inclined to dispose
of the case on procedural grounds. See id. at 3417-19 (observing that the
majority of the questions from the Bench in Minnick were focused on the
plaintiff's standing).
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